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The absence of the deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in ofﬁce can be
negative or positive for society. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while
others may pursue beneﬁcial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short
term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while pre-
serving willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians
the option to choose between a ﬂexible pension scheme and a ﬁxed pension scheme.
In a ﬂexible pension scheme, the pension increases with short term performance as
measured by the vote share of the ofﬁceholder’s party in the next election. This sys-
tem increases social welfare by letting ofﬁceholders self-select into those activities
that most beneﬁt society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a sys-
tem and assess its robustness. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to
non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result.
Keywords: elections, political contracts, vote-share thresholds, incumbents, selec-
tion, effort
JEL Classiﬁcation: D7
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Motivation and Proposal
During a politician’s last term in ofﬁce, the absence of a reelection mechanism may cause
inefﬁciencies in the democratic system. Ofﬁceholders may reduce their efforts as they no
longer need to fear removal by deselection. On the other hand, a last-term situation also
presents an opportunity to pursue policies unpopular in the short term but beneﬁcial in the
long term, precisely because the threat of deselection is no longer operative.
We propose a novel mechanism called pension system with choice that deals with
these two situations simultaneously. This system encourages politicians to work harder
in their last term while at the same time not deterring them from implementing beneﬁcial
long-term policies that have potential negative effects in the short term. A fundamental
feature of the system is the presence of a menu consisting of two pension options that
ofﬁceholders can choose from. The system works as follows:
• At the beginning of the last term, the incumbent decides whether to select a ﬁxed
or a ﬂexible pension scheme.
• The former scheme prescribes a ﬁxed pension, while the retirement income under a
ﬂexible scheme increases with the vote share of the ofﬁceholder’s party in the next
election.
There are various motivations for this proposal. First, ofﬁceholders choosing a ﬂexible
pension scheme have an incentive to work harder in their last term. Second, ofﬁcehold-
ers choosing a ﬁxed scheme can pursue potentially unpopular long-term policies without
fearing adverse monetary consequences. Third, the system should enable ofﬁceholders to
select themselves into those activities that most beneﬁt the electorate. Fourth, the pension
system with choice does not require more information than that which is already gener-
ated by elections, namely the vote share. Fifth, the proposed pension system is robust
vis-` a-vis various variations in the importance of pensions. Typically, the importance of
pensions varies with the speciﬁc situation of the ofﬁceholder (e.g. type of executive po-
sition, wealth and outside career options, expected retirement duration). It may be very
difﬁcult to estimate these factors beforehand, so robustness is a desirable feature.
Model and Results
In a simple political agency model we introduce the pension scheme described above
and explain its functioning. We assume that there are two types of politicians: populists
and statesmen. Populists are interested in holding ofﬁce and receiving a high income
upon retirement. Statesmen share those interests but are also inclined to pursue long-term
policies.
2Our main insights are as follows: The pension system with choice simultaneously
inducespopuliststoworkhardintheirlasttermand preservesthewillingnessofstatesmen
to choosesociallydesirablelong-term policiesthat may be unpopularat themoment. This
improves welfare. In the extension of the model to non-last-term situations, we outline a
pension system with choice that insures ofﬁceholders who have chosen a ﬂexible scheme
against low pensions if they lose their reelection bid. Even in cases where there is high
probability that ofﬁceholders will run for ofﬁce in the next term this pension scheme is
welfare-improving in the current term.
We further show that voters will unambiguouslyfavor the introduction of the system,
whereas current ofﬁceholders may oppose it. However, it is always possible to adjust the
level of pensions in a system with choice such that current ofﬁceholders are not worse off.
In their last term, all types of ofﬁceholder will favor the implementation of the pension
system with choice for subsequent terms. Finally, we consider several consequences the
introduction of such a pension system may have on the functioning of elections in partic-
ular, and on democracy in general. For instance, using the vote share as our indicator may
increase the willingness of both parties and voters to sanction bad performance, which
in turn may increase the effectiveness of a pension system with choice. Moreover, the
proposed pension system allows ofﬁceholders to signal their type and may help increase
the pool of farsighted agents running for public ofﬁce.
Relation to Literature
Our proposal and analysis are motivated by the following strands in the literature: First,
during their last term in ofﬁce some incumbents may not exert high effort, or may choose
policies that deviate from what is socially optimal during the last term in ofﬁce, as de-
scribed by Alesina and Speak (1988), Becker and Stigler (1974), Barro (1973), Carey
(1994), Smart and Sturm (2004). Second, precisely because they are not subject to re-
election in their last term some incumbents may initiate efﬁcient long-term policies that
areunpopularintheshort term . Smart and Sturm (2004)showthat theprospect ofstaying
in ofﬁce can makeeven public-spiritedpoliticiansunwillingto embark on policies that are
in the interests of voters. Those politicians can be viewed as statesmen, as they strive to
maximize long term well-being.1 Third, an incumbent proposing unpopular policies or
associated with bad economic performance in his last term can damage his party in the
next election, even if the incumbent is not running for reelection. Empirical evidence of
this has been provided e.g. by Fair (1996), Hibbs (2000) and more recently by Bechtel
and Heinmueller (2011). There are also famous examples of this nexus. In the 2008 elec-
tions the Republican Party and the presidential candidate John McCain appeared to suffer
from the low popularity of the incumbent, George W. Bush.
1Such politicians could also be interpreted as having character, a theme that has been developed by
Gersbach (1999), Callender (2005), and Kartik and McAfee (2006).
3Gersbach and M¨ uller (2010) consider a pure effort problem in the last period and
examine a solution by introducing an information market predicting the incumbent’s
chances of being reelected. The fundamental difference to the present paper is that we
additionally consider the implementation of unpopular projects that are beneﬁcial in the
long term. This makes the application of information markets problematic (as statesmen
would then desist from embarking on such policies). Moreover, measuring performance
by the vote share of the incumbent’s party enables broader application of pension systems
as incentive and selection devices.
Structure of the Article
In the next section we introduce the basic model. The results with ﬁxed and pure ﬂexi-
ble pension schemes are analyzed in section 3. Section 4 contains our main results. In
section 5 we consider the impact of external career opportunities on the pension system
with choice. Section 6 is concerned with implementation issues and underlying risks. In
section 7 we introduce a generalization of the proposed pension system for application
to non-last-term situations. Section 8 reﬂects on the indirect consequences that the pro-
posed pension system may have on democracy. Appendix A contains selected proofs. In
appendix B we extend the model to non-last-term situations. Appendix C outlines the
notation used in this paper.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a two-period political agency problem with asymmetric information regard-
ing the type of incumbent. We assume that either a populist or a statesman has been
elected into ofﬁce and analyze the decisions the politician faces at the beginning of his
last term in ofﬁce.
There are two periods denoted by t = 1,2. Period 1 is the last term for the ofﬁce-
holder. It is common knowledge that t = 1 is the last term, either because the ofﬁceholder
has announced it or because there is a term limit.2 In period 2 the (now former) ofﬁce-
holder receives a pension. The public consists of two generations. The current (i.e. older)
generation lives in periods 1 and 2. The voters in the older generation outnumber those
in the younger generation. The members of the older generation have common interests
regardingthepolicies that theofﬁceholder shouldpursuein hislast term. The ofﬁceholder
may, however, select policies that hurt the current generation but beneﬁt the younger and
future generation. 3 The details of the model are set out in the next subsections.
2In appendix B we extend the model to situations in which the public is unsure whether the current term
is the ofﬁceholder’s last.
3We consideronlyonefuturegeneration,but the extensionto otherfuturegenerationsis straightforward.
42.1 Policy Choices
The incumbent in period 1 is risk neutral and takes two policy decisions.
First, he chooses how much effort to exert on a public project. The level of effort
chosen is denoted by e. We assume that due to physical constraints there is an upper
bound e > 0 such that 0 ≤ e ≤ e. We use b to denote the beneﬁts per capita from the
public project and assume that they are proportional to the amount of effort, i.e.
b = k e, (1)
with k > 0. Exerting effort is costly for the incumbent. Effort e in period 1 is associated
with costs ce2 for the incumbent. Parameter c can be interpreted in several ways. It
might represent the disutility arising when an incumbent wants to pursue a public project
with high beneﬁts. Disutilities may be caused by reduced private beneﬁts, exhausting or
reducing glamorous activities when high effort is chosen. Factor c can also be interpreted
as the competenceof theincumbent. A smallvaluefor c is equivalentto high competence,
i.e. undertaking a given project does not result in high effort costs for the politician.
Second, the politician can choose a policy that negatively affects the utility of the
currentgeneration butbeneﬁts thefuturegeneration. WeusevariableI to indicatewhether
this long-term policy is undertaken (I = 1) or not (I = 0). If I = 1, the current generation
suffers a utility loss of d per capita (d > 0), while the discounted beneﬁts per capita
for the future generation are denoted by B, B > d. There are many examples featuring
these characteristics. For instance, slowing down global warming or reducing excessive
public debt typically hurt the current generation but improve utilitarian welfare for all
later generations.
2.2 Utility of Politicians and Welfare
We assume that – just like every citizen – the politician receives per capita beneﬁts b = ke
in period 1. In period 2 he receives a pension m (m > 0). There are two possible types
of ofﬁceholder. We use S to denote a statesman politician and P to denote a populist
politician. The utility functions of each type of politician are given by
U(P) = ke−ce2+dm−dI (2)
U(S) = ke−ce2+d(m+bI), (3)
where b (b ≥ 0) quantiﬁes the net personal beneﬁt the statesman derives from the long-
term policy. Future beneﬁts are discounted by d (1 ≥ d > 0). Although the statesman also
suffers a loss when he chooses I =1 – as he himself is a member of the current generation
and has to exert effort to undertake a long-term policy – he takes into account the utility
5gains of future generations. We assume that the net personal utility gain is positive and is
represented by bI.
The populist does not consider the well-being of future generations and like all other
citizens suffers the utility loss d when he selects I. When the size of generations 1 and 2
is N1 and N2, respectively, utilitarian welfare is given by
b W = N1b−N1dI+N2IB, (4)
which we normalize by dividing by 1
N2B−N1d+N1 and rewrite as
W = ab+(1−a)I, (5)





We assume N2B−N1d > 0, which implies 0 < a < 1.
2.3 Elections
As discussed in the introduction, 4 the election replacing the current ofﬁceholder at the
end of period 1 is assumed to be inﬂuenced by the past performance of the ofﬁceholder
(retrospective voting). In a reduced form, we assume that the voting outcome in terms of
the received vote share for the governing party can be summarized as follows:
s = b fIb+e = fIe+e, (7)
where b fI =
fI
k ; b fI and fI are constants for each value of I; e is a random variable uni-
formly distributed with support [−¯ e,¯ e] and mean 0. Equation (7) links together three
factors that inﬂuence the voting prospects of the incumbent’s party. First, higher effort
and hence larger beneﬁts for the current generation favorably affect voter support for the
party in power. Second, we assume f1 < f0 as a long-term policy in this context hurts
the current generation and is thus unpopular. As a consequence, the expected vote share
declines when the incumbent chooses I = 1, as voters will punish the party. Third, from
the perspective of the incumbent selecting his policies, the effects described above are
uncertain. This is represented by the random variable e.
Our formulation of the voting outcome is quite ﬂexible. It allows voting behavior to
be inﬂuenced by performance and other characteristics such as the type of politician. 5
The only essential assumption is that a statesman suffers a net loss of the share of votes if
he adopts a long-term policy.
4See Fair (1996), Hibbs (2000), and Bechtel and Heinmueller (2011) for empirical evidence on this
matter.
5One could express fI in dependence of the type of a politician by writing e.g. s = fI,Te+e = (a′ +
b′T −c′I)e+e, where T is either P or S and c′ > 0.
62.4 Pensions
As the ofﬁceholder is in his last term, deselection is not a threat, so pensionsare one of the
only devices the public has to inﬂuence his actions. We distinguish two pension schemes:
• Standard (ﬁxed) pension scheme, which prescribes a ﬁxed pension level denoted by
mﬁx (mﬁx > 0). mﬁx is independent of any action taken by the politician during his
terms in ofﬁce. This is the system currently implemented in practice.
• Flexible pension scheme, which contains a ﬁxed pension payment m0 combined
with a ﬂexible payment µs tied to the vote share s that the politician’s party obtains
in the next election (when the ofﬁceholder is replaced):
mﬂex = m0+µs = m0+µ(fIe+e), (8)
where s = fIe+e is as described above, µ is a positive constant. It follows that the
expected value E of mﬂex is
E(mﬂex) = m0+µfIe.
The vote share and hence the level of pension under a ﬂexible scheme depends on
the amount of effort investedby the politician and on whether he has implemented a
long-term policy. Higher effort raises the pension, implementinga long-term policy
lowers it.
We are now ready to deﬁne the pension system with choice.
Deﬁnition 1 (Pension System with Choice)
A pension system with choice is a menu consisting of two options which politicians can
choose between at the beginning of their last term in ofﬁce. The options are a ﬁxed
pension scheme and a ﬂexible pension scheme as deﬁned above. The schemes are fully
speciﬁed by the three parameters mﬁx,m0,µ, and this parameter combination is denoted
by PSC(mﬁx,m0,µ). If the politician steps down early in his term, then he will be subject
to a ﬁxed scheme.
2.5 Utilities under Pension System With Choice
Undera pension systemwith choice, politicianssimultaneouslyselect their preferred pen-
sion scheme, their effort level e, and whether or not to implement a long-term policy.
Suppose that a PSC(mﬁx,m0,µ) is offered. We use ﬂex (ﬂexible pension scheme) or ﬁx
(ﬁxed pension scheme), to denote the pension choice. The expected utility for politicians
depends on all the above-mentioned choices and on their type:
7E(U(P)|ﬁx & I = 0) = ke−ce2+dmﬁx (9)
E(U(P)|ﬂex & I = 0) = ke−ce2+d(m0+µf0e) (10)
E(U(S)|ﬁx)I = ke−ce2+d(mﬁx+bI) (11)
E(U(S)|ﬂex)I = ke−ce2+d(m0+µfIe+bI) (12)
Note that the populist has a strict incentive to choose I = 0 as he would otherwise suffer
loss d as given in equation (2)6. By assuming that the value of the outside option is zero,
we know that participation constraints are fulﬁlled for every feasible problem parameter-
ization, i.e. ofﬁceholders never step down. The assumption concerning the outside option
does not restrict the generality of our analysis. If the outside option has a utility larger
than zero, we can reformulate the model into an equivalent one where the outside option
has zero utility.
2.6 Information Structure
We assume that voters are able to perfectly observe the value of I and b on election day
at the end of period 1 and can perfectly infer e7. Neither I, e, nor the welfare change
caused by these policies are contractable, so they cannot be used in pension schemes. 8
Politiciansobservetheirtypes and are informed ofthe pensionframework theyare subject
to. If they are subject to the pension system with choice, they are informed of parameter
combination PSC(m0,µ,mﬁx), which completely speciﬁes the options from which they
can choose.
2.7 Summary
If politicians are subject to the pension system with choice, then the timing of the game
is summarized in the following ﬁgure:
6Assuming a net loss d for P if I = 1 is not necessary for the analysis. The assumption d > 0 highlights
the fact that it is impossible to motivate P to choose I = 1.
7The model could be extended by allowing that effort cannot be inferred precisely, e.g. by expressing b
as b = ke+c, where c is a random variable with E(c) = 0
8If policy actions were contractable, monetary incentive schemes could in principle induce both politi-
cians to exert high effort and to undertake unpopular long-term policies, following the logic of political
contracts surveyed in Gersbach (2008). However, such contracts require more information, and they also
require other performance measures than election results.









Vote share is realized
Figure 1
Under a ﬁxed or ﬂexible pension scheme, the time line of the game is the same except for
the fact that the pension choice is omitted.
We now look for perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. In general, we will ob-
tain and focus on separating equilibria in which statesmen and populists make different
choices regarding the long-term policy and thus reveal themselves as statesmen and pop-
ulists to voters. We will construct the pension system with choice so that statesmen and
populists choose different pension schemes and select different effort levels.
3 Standard and Flexible Pension Schemes
It is useful to start the analysis with the outcomes that would arise if only the ﬁxed or the
ﬂexible scheme were available. The initial results follow immediately.
Proposition 1
If politicians are subject to a ﬁxed pension scheme, then both populists and statesmen
choose an effort level of e = k
2c. Additionally, statesmen choose I = 1.
Proposition1 followsdirectly from thespeciﬁcations of theutilityfunctions ofpoliti-
cians, as given in equations (9) and (11). Optimal effort choice is obtained from maximiz-
ing ke−ce2, which yields e = k
2c. A ﬁxed scheme preserves the statesman’s incentive to
choose the socially desirable long-term policy, but the populist and the statesman chooses
a comparatively low effort level. The latter can be remedied by a ﬂexible pension scheme,
which yields Proposition 2.
Proposition 2
If politicians are subject to a ﬂexible pension scheme, then we distinguish two cases: If




both populists and statesmen choose an effort level of e =
k+dµf0
2c and I = 0. If
b ≥ bcrit,
9then the populist exerts effort e =
k+dµf0
2c and choose I = 0, while the statesman chooses
e =
k+dµf1
2c and I = 1.
Proposition 2 follows directly from the the maximization of the politicians’ utility
functions with respect to e and I. Proposition 2 shows how effort levels for all types of
politiciancan be increased by such ﬂexibleschemes, which beneﬁts thecurrent electorate.
Proposition 2 also reveals the problem of ﬂexible pension schemes. On the one hand they
increase the effort level of both types of ofﬁceholder, which beneﬁts the public. On the
other hand, if the long-term policy is quite unpopular and f0−f1 is large, only statesmen
with a pronounced interest in such policies choose them. Otherwise, the statesman de-
sists from choosing I = 1 even if it is socially desirable. If f0−f1 is sufﬁciently small,
this inefﬁciency of ﬂexible pension schemes does not arise. In such cases, the problem
of motivating incumbents to choose I = 1 is small. The situations in which signiﬁcant
popularity losses deter incumbents from choosing socially desirable long-term policies is
the drawback of the ﬂexible system. For the remainder of the paper, we assume b < bcrit
and that for society welfare is higher when the statesmen chooses I = 1 and e = k
2c over
and against I = 0 and e =
k+dµf0
2c for all possible values of µ, i.e. µ ∈ [0,b µ], where b µ is the












If Assumption 1 does not hold, the ﬂexible pension scheme is preferable to the ﬁxed
scheme and to the system with choice from the welfare perspective.
4 Properties of Pension System With Choice
We start by examining the behavior of the populist.
Proposition 3






the populist chooses the ﬂexible pension scheme and exert an additional effort of
dµf0






the populist chooses the ﬁxed scheme.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the appendix. Proposition 3 provides the
condition under which a populist exerts higher effort under a pension system with choice
than under a ﬁxed scheme. The idea behind our next steps is to design a pension system
with choice in which statesmen achieve higher beneﬁts under a ﬁxed pension scheme and
choose I =1, while populistsﬁnd the ﬂexible scheme more proﬁtable if this gives them an
incentive to exert higher effort. The next proposition establishes necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions.
Proposition 4
Suppose the PSC(m0,µ,mﬁx) is offered. The populist chooses the ﬂexible scheme and the












The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix. It is instructive to compare
conditions for b in Propositions 2 and 4. While condition (13) in Proposition 2 depends
on the voting behavior of the publicwhen I =1, the right-hand side of condition (16) does
not depend on any assessment of how long-term policies will affect voting behavior.
Corollary 1
Suppose that m0 is equal to the lower bound given in Inequality (15) of Proposition 4.
Then, for any value of b the statesman chooses the ﬁxed scheme and implements a long-
term policy. Hence, there exists a separating equilibrium for the political agency game.
Corollary 1 arises by substituting into condition (16) the lower bound for m0 given
in Inequality (15). We could hence choose a value of m0 that is only minimally higher
than the lower bound for m0 and be sure that only statesmen with b very close to zero will
select a ﬂexible pension scheme. We next show that there exists a pension system with
choice that is welfare-increasing compared to the current ﬁxed pension system even under





11(i) S chooses the ﬁxed scheme, I = 1 (implementation of long-term policy), and effort
level b e = k
2c.
(ii) P chooses the ﬂexible scheme; I = 0, and effort level e =
k+dµf0
2c > b e;
(iii) expected expenditures under the pension system with choice and under the ﬁxed
pension system are equal (expected budget neutrality).
The proof is given in the appendix. Theorem 1 shows that with a suitably chosen
pension system with choice, ofﬁceholders self-select into those activities that, given their
types, are most beneﬁcial for society. The characterization in Theorem 1 and budget
neutrality allow us to make welfare comparisons.
Corollary 2
The pension system with choice is welfare-enhancing
• with respect to the ﬁxed pension scheme (as populists work harder) and
• with respect to the ﬂexible pension scheme (as all statesmen implement a long-term
policy).
We further observe that the pension system with choice as characterized in Theorem 1
exhausts all possible welfare improvements that can be achieved by the pension systems
under the following conditions: ﬁrst, only election results can be used; second, the system
has to be budget-neutral in expected terms; third, the statesman always selects the long-
term policy.
5 Career Opportunities
In this section we extend our ﬁndings to encompass situations where politicians may have
access to alternativecareer opportunitiesonce theyleave ofﬁce. If thecareer opportunities
are unrelated to the effort choice in the last period, our results continue to hold. These
opportunities may, however, also depend to a certain extent on the popularity politicians
have achieved upon leaving ofﬁce. This may further deter politicians from undertaking
an unpopular policy, even if it can be expected to yield large social beneﬁts in the future.
Such career opportunities could be integrated into our model by adding an additional
popularityfactor gs in theutilityfunction of the politicians,where s is again thevote share
of the incumbent’s party in the next election. We consider two cases: career opportunities
that only affect the populists and career opportunities that affect both types of politician.
12Career Opportunities for Populists only
In this case, the utility of the populist becomes
U(P) = ke−ce2+d(m+gs)−dI. (17)
Assuming this modiﬁcation applies to the populist only (meaning that the statesman’s
utility function is unchanged), the additional feature of the model does not impair the
mechanism under the pension system with choice given in Theorem 1 and can even im-
prove it. In this case, the parameters m0 or µ specifying the ﬂexible scheme might be
chosen at a lower level than before, as the populist has generally an overall higher in-
centive to work hard. Alternatively, mﬁx might be chosen at a higher level than before.
This simple intuition can be readily translated into formal terms. The interval of values










The upper bound for m0 is unchanged, as the statesman’s utility has not changed, while
the lower bound is smaller and can be obtained from the lower bound given in Proposition




Career Opportunities for all Politicians
Imagine now that both types of politician have access to future career opportunities if
theirpopularityremains high uponretirement from ofﬁce. The statesman’sutilityis hence
transformed analogously:
U(S) = ke−ce2+d(m+gs+bI). (19)
Solving the model with the new utility functions under the pension system with choice
leads to an analogous version of Proposition 4:
Proposition 5















Then the populistchooses theﬂexiblescheme and thestatesman chooses the ﬁxed scheme
and implements a long-term policy. P chooses effort e =
k+d(µ+g)f0
2c and I = 0 and S
chooses e=
k+dgf0
2c and I =1. Hence, under theaboveconditions,there existsa separating
equilibrium for the political agency game.
13Proposition 5 follows the same logic as Proposition 4 and leads to analogous versions
of Corollary 1 and Theorem 1. In this case as well, the pension system with choice
can be shown to be budget-neutral with respect to the standard ﬁxed pension scheme.
The interval of values for m0 in Proposition 5 is larger compared to the one obtained
in Proposition 4. Both the upper and lower bounds for m0 are smaller than the bounds
obtained in Proposition 4. If we replace m0 by its lower bound given in Proposition 5, the
lower bound for b is again zero.
We conclude that the introduction of popularity-dependent career opportunities for
both types of politician induces both of them to invest higher effort and enables the de-
signer to construct a pension system with choice where the pension amount under the
ﬂexible scheme can be chosen to be lower than it would have to be without career oppor-
tunities.
6 Implementation and Practical Considerations
In this section we discuss how the pension system with choice might be implemented.
Moreover, we assess potential risks and identify practical issues connected with the intro-
duction of a pension system with choice.
6.1 Possibility of Implementation
Weapproach thepossibilityofimplementingthescheme(a)fromtheperspectiveofvoters
and (b) from the perspective of politicians.
Interest of Voters
We observe that in comparison with the ﬁxed pension scheme both generations proﬁt
from the new system. Populists exert higher effort and statesmen behave in the same way
as under the standard ﬁxed scheme by choosing I = 1 and e = k
2c. Note that pensions
with choice do not inﬂuence the behavior of statesmen (with respect to status quo). The
new system does not give any additional incentive to statesmen to implement long-term
projects, which may or may not be high-risk and welfare-increasing. Therefore, voters
would unanimously support the introduction of a pension system with choice.
Interest of Politicians
In contrast to voters, both types of politician have lower utility under the pension system
with choice as summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6
Both types of politician have lower utility under a pension system with choice if budget
neutrality is required with respect to the standard ﬁxed pension scheme.
14The proof of Proposition 6 is given in the appendix. We conclude that ofﬁceholders
have no incentive to introduce the pension system with choice, so a campaign promise
in favor of the new pension system is not credible. The resistance of ofﬁceholders can
be overcome in several ways. For instance, ofﬁceholders have incentives to introduce the
pension system with choice with some delay as set out in Gersbach and Kleinschmidt
(2009). Ofﬁceholders in their last term have strict incentives to introduce the pension
scheme with choice that becomes effective in subsequent terms as they will beneﬁt from
it as citizens. Another way of easing the introduction of the system with choice is to
increase pension levels by allowing more money to be spent on pensions than under the
ﬁxed scheme.
6.2 Risks of Implementation
Power of Pensions as Incentive Devices
Pensions may be more or less relevant for politicians depending on the type of executive
ofﬁce (president, chancellor, minister, mayor of a city), their wealth and outside options,
and the expected retirement duration. Such differences do not pose a problem for the
pension system with choice. To see this, we modify the utility functions for a politician
to
U(P) = ke−ce2+dgm−dI (20)
U(S) = ke−ce2+d(gm+bI), (21)
where g is a random variable with E[g] = 1, measuring the importance of the pension, i.e.
the power of the pension as an incentive device. Assume g is not known in advance and
that the PSC was chosen for the case g =1. If g turns out to be lower than 1, all politicians
choose the ﬁxed scheme. In this case the pension system with choice has no effect. If g
is higher than 1, it might be the case that statesmen choose the ﬂexible scheme. Then the
effort levels of both populists and statesmen are very high, which tends to compensate for
the loss of not choosing I = 1.
Choice of Pension Parameters
Could the pension system with choice perform worse than the standard ﬁxed pension
scheme, when either the parameters in PSC(mﬁx,m0,µ) are chosen erroneously or the
assumptionsabout thepoliticians’parameters have been too pessimisticortoo optimistic?
There are two fundamental causes for potential downside risk. Suppose ﬁrst that for
populists the ﬁxed scheme is more attractive than the ﬂexible scheme. This may occur if
the expected pension gains do not outweigh the higher effort costs. Then, both types of
ofﬁceholder would choose the ﬁxed scheme, and the introduction of the ﬂexible scheme
has no effect.
15Suppose next that for statesmen the ﬂexible scheme promises higher utility than the
ﬁxed scheme. This may occur if the interest of the statesman in pursuing long-term poli-
cies is smalloriftheexpected risein pensionswiththeﬂexibleschemeis large. In theﬁrst
case, the risk for society is small, but it may be higher in the second case as the ﬂexible
scheme may crowd out intrinsically motivated policy choices. So if society is interested
in avoiding the downside risk from the pension system with choice, the expected pension
gains in the ﬂexible system should be kept moderate. This can be achieved by choosing
pension parameters in such a way that the statesman’s expected gains with b=0 are equal
under the ﬂexible and ﬁxed schemes (Theorem 1).
Risk Aversion of Politicians
Ifpoliticianstendtoberisk-averse, thepopulistsinparticularneed someinsurancetokeep
them disposed to choosing the ﬂexible scheme. This could be achieved by increasing the
parameter m0 (withstanding the fact that some statesmen with small b may now choose
the ﬂexible scheme) or by designing the ﬂexible scheme so that it switches to a ﬁxed
scheme after a speciﬁc number of years.
Overall, the risks of implementing a pension system with choice appear to be rela-
tively small.
6.3 Public Disclosure of Pension Choice
According to Theorem 1, there exists a pension system with choice, fully speciﬁed by the
3-tuplePSC(mﬁx,m0,µ), under which all statesmen choose a ﬁxed scheme and implement
a long-term policy, while populists choose a ﬂexible scheme. If the pension decision is
announced publicly,thetype ofpoliticianin ofﬁce is revealed at thebeginningof theterm.
However, even if voters do not know the pension choice made by ofﬁceholders, voters are
able to observe the choice regarding I at the time of elections at the end of period 1
and can hence infer the type of incumbent. Accordingly, transparency requirements for
pension decisions are redundant in this setting. In section 8 we take up this topic again in
connection with the eventuality of imperfect knowledge of e and I.
7 Generalizing the Pension System with Choice
So far, we have focused on pension choices in the last term in ofﬁce. In this section we
extend the pension system to situations in which it is not clear a priori how many terms
the ofﬁceholder will stay in ofﬁce. The term may be the last one (because of term limitsor
personal reasons) or the ofﬁceholder may be successfully reelected. The formal treatment
of this extension of the model, which we refer to as the model with reelection, is given in
16appendix B.
7.1 Complication
A straightforward application of the pension system with choice to non-last-term situa-
tions is not feasible. Two potential problems arise.
• Populistschoosingtheﬂexibleschememay havelowpensionsiftheyaredeselected
as in such cases the vote share is necessarily low. This makes it more difﬁcult to
motivatepopuliststo choosetheﬂexibleschemeintheﬁrst place. As aconsequence
the ﬂexible scheme has to made more attractive to populists relative to the ﬁxed
scheme.
• Statesmen angling for reelection with only little interest in the long-term policy
cannot be motivated to choose this policy with a pension system with choice as the
popularity loss is too costly in comparative terms.
The above insights are formalized in appendix B, in particular in Proposition 8. The
bottom line is that when the reelection system is taken into the model the existence of a
welfare enhancing PCS is not guaranteed for all feasible problem parameterizations.
Concerning the ﬁrst of the above two points, we note that under a ﬂexible scheme
the expected pension level conditional on losing the election is lower than the level con-
ditional on not running for reelection:
E[mﬂex|“Politician has lost reelection”] ≤ E[mﬂex|“Politician has stepped down”]. (22)
The reason is that the vote share is necessarily low if the politician is deselected (even
if he has chosen a high level of effort). This makes it particularly difﬁcult to motivate
populists to select the ﬂexible scheme. To circumvent this problem, we could add an
additional parameter µ′ to the PCS and use it to deﬁne a different ﬂexible pension scheme
when the politician loses reelection. In other words, if the politician chooses a ﬂexible
scheme, either
mﬂex(s|“Politician has lost reelection”) = m0+µ′s,
or
mﬂex(s|“Politician has stepped down”) = m0+µs,
willbeappliedwithµ =µ′. Wecouldchooseµ′ sothatInequality(22)holdsasanequality.
It can be shown that this leads to
µ′ = 2µ.
17Continuing along these lines does not solve all problems, though. Even if the expected
pension level is set to be independent from the decision on running for reelection, it is
still not possible to ensure the existence of a welfare-increasing system in all cases.9 In
the following, we adhere to the pension system with choice with three parameters and
develop a modiﬁed pension system that is universally welfare-improving.
7.2 Extending the Pension System with Choice
In this section we introduce a modiﬁed version of the pension system with choice that
insures an agent against a low pension if he receives a low vote share in his reelection bid.
This scheme also prescribes the pension rules for all conceivable contingencies that may
occur in an arbitrary term.
Deﬁnition 2 (Extended Pension System with Choice)
The extended pension system with choice works as follows:
(i) In each period he is in ofﬁce, the ofﬁceholder decides between a ﬁxed pension and
a ﬂexible pension according to PSC(mﬁx,m0,µ).
(ii) If, at a later stage, the politician decides to run for reelection and is rejected, he will
be subject to the ﬁxed pension scheme.
(iii) If the politician does not to run for reelection or is in his last possible term, he will
be subject to the chosen scheme.
(iv) If the politician steps down early in his term, he will be subject to a ﬁxed scheme.
Ofﬁceholders have the right to choose (or to change) their preferred scheme at the
beginning of each term they are in ofﬁce.
7.2.1 Results
The formal analysis of the extended pension system with choice is given in subsection
9.3 of appendix B. Here we summarize the main results. If the probability of running for
reelection is low – in the extreme case zero – the extended pension system with choice
replicates the main results from section 4. If the probability of running for reelection is
high, the choices of e and I are driven by the reelection concern and the ﬁxed pension
scheme. In the case of a reelection chance equal to 1, the extended system is in fact
equivalent to the current ﬁxed scheme. Beyond these two polar cases we ﬁnd that the
extended system with choice can be designed to be welfare-improving for any 0 ≤ q < 1
9Further details available on request.
18(Theorem 2). Additionally the system can be universally applied in all terms and under
all problem speciﬁcations.
8 Discussion
A pension system with choice is expected to have a variety of further consequences on
the way elections impact on democracy. Here are some examples.
Vote Share as an Indicator
The use of the vote share to determine the size of the pension in the ﬂexible scheme might
trigger further behavioral changes. For instance, politicians may have a stronger interest
in the functioning of their party and hence in the performance of other members of their
party, and also in their public perception as representatives of the party. Voting behavior
might also be affected. Casting votes simultaneously selects the ofﬁceholder for the next
term but it may also determine the level of the pension for the past ofﬁceholder if he has
chosen a ﬂexible scheme. This might increase the willingness to sanction performance
that would increase the effectiveness of the pension system with choice.
Signaling Character
In section 6.3 we argued that public disclosure of the choice of pension by the ofﬁce-
holder is redundant. However, if voters do not observe e and I separately but only joint
performance, transparency regarding pension choices might have an impact on voting be-
havior if voters value the type (or character) of ofﬁceholder independently. In this case,
the voters observe only the general state of the economy, which can either be high or low.
A low state could be connected with the implementationof a long-term policy or with low
effort. Then the choice of a ﬁxed pension scheme will signal “statesman” and could po-
tentially reduce the popularity loss the politician incurs by choosing I = 1 if voters value
his character independently.
If the politician’s pension choice is announced to the public and the type of politician
can be partially inferred from this choice, parameters f0 and f1 may be modiﬁed by the
following equations:
fnew
0 = hf0+(1−h)q0Prob(S|Pension Choice) (23)
fnew
1 = hf1+(1−h)q1Prob(S|Pension Choice), (24)
for positive parameters h and q.
Assuming that fnew
0 ≥ f0, fnew
1 ≥ f1, fnew
0 > fnew
1 and b W2 > m0+µfnew
0 e, the mech-
anism described in Theorem 1 would still work, so populists would choose the ﬂexible
scheme and statesmen with large enough b would choose the ﬁxed scheme. As long as
19f0 > f1, the populists have no incentives to mimic the statesmen. The closer f1 is to f0,
the more statesmen will be motivated to implement long-term policies.
Selection of Candidates for Ofﬁce
Allowing ofﬁceholders to choose their pension and signal their type may affect the will-
ingness of agents to run as candidates for ofﬁce. In particular, higher expected pay might
attract candidates with higher abilities. 10 In our context, there might be a concern that
imposing budget neutrality – and a decline of ﬁxed pensions – would undermine the in-
terest of citizens and in particular of statesmen in running for public ofﬁce. This could be
remedied by increasing the level of pensions for statesmen and the expected pension for
populists in the same way (i.e. giving up budget neutrality).
9 Conclusion
We have proposed a pension system with choice for politicians. Such a system only
requires information generated in the normal course of elections and would thus, in prin-
ciple, be relatively simple to implement.
The idea of pensions with choice could be applied more generally. Managers in
the private sector could be offered the choice between a ﬁxed and a ﬂexible scheme, the
latterdepending on theperformance of thecompany. To avoid manipulationby managers,
performance would be measured some time after the manager has stepped down, and the
pension with choice would also only become effective after this time lag. These and
similar applications of the pension system with choice deserve further scrutiny in future
research.
10A recent empirical study supporting this view is Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2009).
20Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3
By Proposition 1 and 2 we know that the populist chooses e = k
2c under a ﬁxed pension
scheme and e =
k+dµf0
2c under a ﬂexible pension scheme. In both cases, he does not
implement a long-term policy as he would suffer loss d. Hence, if given the choice, P
opts for a ﬂexible scheme if and only if
E(Umax(P|ﬂex & I = 0)) > E(Umax(P|ﬁx & I = 0)).

















































Proof of Proposition 4
If the statesman decides not to implement a long-term policy, his utility function is identi-






the statesman chooses I = 1 if and only if one of the following inequalities holds:






























The lower bound for b in (27) depends on the difference f0−f1 and is zero if and only
if µ is zero, which would mean that the ﬂexible scheme reduces to a ﬁxed scheme. We
see here that a ﬂexible scheme can never motivate every statesman to implement a long-
term policy. On the contrary, as outlined in Corollary 1, the lower bound for b in (28)
can be brought down to zero if we replace m0 by its lower bound mﬁx−
2kµf0+d(µf0)2
4c in
Proposition 3 (i), which we denote here by mlow
0 .







This results from comparing the right-hand sides of Inequalities (25) and (26) and pro-












is not empty, and each value of m0 contained in this interval incentivizes the populist to
choose a ﬂexible scheme and the statesman to choose a ﬁxed scheme, provided b fulﬁlls
equation (28). It remains to be shown that interval (29) contains at least one feasible, i.e.
positive value to be assigned to m0. This follows by noting that mlow
0 (µ = 0) = mﬁx and
dmlow
0
dµ < 0. Hence, we can choose the parameter µ in such a way that the lower bound of
interval (29) is positive and each value contained in interval (29) is feasible.
Proof of Theorem 1
Part (i) and (ii)
Let m0 be equal to its lower bound mlow
0 given in Proposition 4, Inequality (15). At this
level of m0, the populist is indifferent between the ﬂexible and the ﬁxed scheme, so we
can assume that the populist chooses the ﬂexible scheme and exerts higher effort. On the
other hand, m0 = mlow
0 gives the statesman an incentive to choose the ﬁxed scheme and
implement the long-term policy for every b > 0. This results from substituting m0 = mlow
0
in the lower bound for b given in Proposition 4, as stated in Corollary 1.
Part (iii)
22We want the pension system with choice to be budget-neutral with respect to the ﬁxed
pension scheme, which is the one currently implemented in practice. Hence, it must hold
that
b m = wmﬁx+(1−w)mﬂex,
where w is the probability that the ofﬁceholder is a statesman and b m is the government






















Solving for mﬁx yields
m
EQ











dµ are negative and mlow
0 (µ = 0) = mﬁx and m
EQ
ﬁx (µ = 0) = b m ,
we deduce that for each feasible parameter combination (k,c,d,f0,f1, b m) we can ﬁnd
a PSC(mﬁx,m0,µ) that fulﬁlls the budget constraint.
Maximizing welfare means maximizing µ, as the increase in effort for the populists is
expressed by
dµf0
2c and does not depend on m0. In a separating equilibrium, a high value
of µ requires a low value of m0. If m0 ≥ 0, feasible values for µ are






Hence we can choose a value of µ that is as close as possible to its upper bound, provided
that the right-hand side of equation (30) is positive and the vote share s ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
As in the proof of Theorem 1, the budget neutrality requirement is expressed as
b m = wmﬁx+(1−w)mﬂex,
where w is the probability that the ofﬁceholder is a statesman and b m is the government










(as determined by the value of m0 = mlow
0 in Theorem 1) in the budget neutrality equation
yields










23Solving for mﬁx yields
m
EQ




Thus, it holds that m
EQ
ﬁx < b m. The effort that the statesman exerts under the current ﬁxed
schemeand undertheﬁxed schemewithinthepensionsystem with choiceisequal. Hence,
it follows that for the statesman the utility is lower under the pension system with choice.




ﬂex, the populist is indifferent between the two
schemes, i.e. he achieves thesame utility. The populistis also worse off underthe pension
systemwithchoicethanunderthecurrentpensionscheme. Notethatm
EQ
ﬂex islargerthan b m,
but the resulting utility under the ﬂexible scheme within the pension system with choice
is lower than the utility under the ﬁxed scheme. This is because m
EQ
ﬂex has to compensate
for the loss of utility brought about by the cost of higher effort.
24Appendix B: Generalizing Pensions with Choice
In thissection wegeneralizethemodeldescribed insection2 and assumethatat theend of




The ofﬁceholder is reelected if his vote share is larger than, or equal to, 1
2. As in the
basic version of the model the vote share is modeled by s = fIe+e, where e is a random
variable uniformly distributed with support [−¯ e,¯ e] and mean 0. We use rI to denote the
probabilitythat the ofﬁceholderwill be reelected (conditionalon a speciﬁc levelof effort),





















































2¯ e and aI =
fI
2¯ e. We focus on constellations where interior solutions can be used




−fIe > −¯ e. (32)
This condition can be expressed in exogenous parameters and holds in particular if the
ratio of k to the effort cost parameter c is sufﬁciently small. Moreover, to simplify the
analysis we set ¯ e = 1
2, which yields v = 0 and aI = fI. Hence, under these assumptions
and parameter choices, it holds that rI = fIe.
9.1.2 Sequence of Events
We study the following sequence of events:
• At the beginning of the term, the incumbent decides on his pension scheme, his
effort level e, and whether or not to undertake a long-term policy, i.e. he chooses
I ∈ {0,1}.
25• With probabilityq the incumbentobservesthat his beneﬁt from having anotherterm
is high and equal to b W2.11 With probability 1−q he observes that the beneﬁt from
being in ofﬁce in the next term is negative and thus will not run for reelection.
We assume that b W2 is sufﬁciently high for the incumbent to always prefer to run for
reelection in all circumstances we will consider. Hence, at the beginning of his term, the
incumbent expects to run for reelection with probability q (0 < q < 1).
9.1.3 Expected Pensions
Undera pension systemwith choice, politicianssimultaneouslyselect their preferred pen-
sion scheme, their effort level e and whether or not to implement a long-term policy at the
beginningof theirterm in period 1. In the model withreelection presented here politicians
make these choices under the uncertainty of running for ofﬁce and under the uncertainty
of reelection. The pension scheme politicians choose in period 1 will be applied to them
in period 2 if they do not run for ofﬁce or if they lose elections. In the latter case, their
pension with a ﬂexible scheme will be based on the vote share they themselves received
in the election and not on the vote share of their party after they have stepped down. This
entails that – if q = 1 – the expected pension level with a ﬂexible scheme is conditional
on the vote share being less than 1
2:

















































11 b W2 is assumed to be sufﬁciently higher than ˆ m.






































































from the result on reelection probability givenin subsection 9.1.1. We assume that 1−fIe
is strictly larger than zero (i.e. there is always a chance of not being reelected). We note
that





























which holds by deﬁnition, as set out in subsection 9.1.2. For ¯ e = 1
2 (as chosen in subsec-


































E[mﬂex|q = 1] = m0+
1
2
µfIe < m0+µfIe = E[mﬂex|q = 0], (37)
12The general rule for solving the particular type of conditional expectation arising in the following
calculation is given by E[X|Bi] =
R
X dP[   |Bi] = 1
P[Bi]  E[FBi  X], where X is a random variable, Bi ∈
s(w), and F is the indicator function.
27as E[e|q = 0] = E[e] = 0.
9.1.4 Utilities of Politicians
In the following we list the modiﬁed expected utility functions of the politicians, taking
into account the possibilityof reelection. To simplify the subsequent analysis, we set both
the discount factor d and the effort cost parameter c equal to 1.
E(U(P)|ﬁx & I = 0)
= (1−q)(ke−e2+mﬁx)+q(ke−e2+f0eb W2+(1−f0e)mﬁx)
= ke−e2+mﬁx+qf0e(b W2−mﬁx)
= −e2+(k+qf0(b W2−mﬁx))e+mﬁx (38)

























































= −e2+(k+qfI(b W2−mﬁx))e+mﬁx+bI (40)
E(U(S)|ﬂex)I



































































































9.2 Pension System with Choice
In the model with reelection, it is no longer trivial that the populist exerts higher effort
under a ﬂexible pension scheme. The critical condition is given in the following Proposi-
tion.
Proposition 7







Proof of Proposition 7
The effort exerted by the populist under a ﬂexible pension scheme is higher than the effort




















Next we look for a welfare improving PSC for which the populist is indifferent be-
tween the ﬂexible and ﬁxed scheme, as this generates the weakest condition on b under
which the statesmanimplementsa long-term policy. The next propositionshows that such
a PSC does not always exist.
29Proposition 8
A PSC(mﬁx,m0,µ) with the following properties:
(i) PSC(mﬁx,m0,µ) is feasible;
(ii) the populist is indifferent between the ﬂexible and ﬁxed scheme;
(iii) PSC(mﬁx,m0,µ) is welfare-enhancing with respect to the ﬁxed scheme if the in-
cumbent is a populist;
can be constructed in a neighborhoodofq=0 but does not always exist in aneighborhood
of q = 1.
Proof of Proposition 8
Step 1
W.l.o.g. we assume 0 < q < 1. The populist is indifferent between the ﬁxed and ﬂexible
















































For a given mﬁx and µ, the populist only chooses the ﬂexible scheme if m0 is either
lower than or equal to mlow
0 or if m0 is larger than or equal to m
high
0 . This property can
be explained as follows: As the effort exerted by the politician decreases if m0 increases,
there are small values of m0 that induce high effort resulting in higher utility under the
ﬂexible scheme than under a ﬁxed scheme, as reelection chances are high. On the other
hand, low effort is connected with high values of m0 (when the indifference requirement
holds for a ﬁxed mﬁx). This ﬂexiblescheme is attractivefor the populistas the ﬁxed part is
high. In the intermediate range of values for m0, the optimal effort choice of the populist
does not provide sufﬁcient beneﬁts for the populist either in terms of higher reelection
chance or higher pension beneﬁts.
Step 2











The functions deﬁned by mlow
0 and m
high




which indicates that mlow
0 is not a feasible choice for small q, as in such cases mlow
0 will
be negative. Taking the limit of m
high
0 for q towards zero yields the solution for m0 found
in the basic model.
Step 3
















































f will be either positive or negative
onC.
Step 4
We examine the extreme cases q = 0 and q = 1. It holds that
lim
q→0+ f = ¥. (44)
As f is continuous in q ∈ (0,1], we conclude that in a neighborhood of q = 0 we can ﬁnd




31Wenowturntothecaseq=1. Considerthederivativeof f withrespecttoµevaluated
in µ = 0. If for a given parameterization of the problem this value is positive, then f will
be positive on C. This would mean that mcritical
0 −m
high
0 > 0 can be satisﬁed for a feasible





























Only in this case is it possible to fulﬁll mcritical
0 −mlow





then requirement (45) contradicts the assumption b W2 > mﬁx.
The proof of Proposition 8 reveals that if the reelection mechanism is taken into ac-
count it is not always possible to design a welfare-increasing pension system with choice
where the populist is indifferent between the schemes. Imposing the indifference require-
ment entails more than technical simpliﬁcation. A PSC satisfying this condition enables
statesmen with relatively low b to implement long-term policies, while ensuring that pop-
ulists increase effort by choosing the ﬂexible scheme. Hence the indifference condition
offers the best opportunity for the PSC to increase welfare.
Theimpossibilityresult ofProposition8 reﬂects the riskinessofchoosingtheﬂexible
scheme when running for ofﬁce in period 2, as the pension the politician may obtain if






can also be understood by inspecting once more the utility function of P under a ﬂexible
scheme:





A high effort level increases the pension level but at the same time decreases the proba-
bility that the ﬂexible pension becomes effective. These countervailing effects pose con-
straints on the highest achievable effort under the pension system with choice. As we will
see in section 9.3, the extended system with choice avoids this problem by restricting the
pension options to the ﬁxed scheme in the case of deselection.
329.3 Extended System with Choice
Proposition 8 gives a formal account of the complication with the pension system with
choice. In section 7 we introduced the extended pension system with choice. We proceed













then there exists a PSCext(mﬁx,m0,µ) for every feasible problem parameterization 
k,c = 1,d = 1,f0,f1,q, b W2

such that













(iii) effort exerted under a ﬂexible scheme is higher than under a ﬁxed scheme for all
0 ≤ q < 1;
(iv) expected expenditures under the extended pension system with choice and under
the current standard ﬁxed pension system are equal.
Proof of Theorem 2
Parts (i), (ii), and (iii)
W.l.o.g. we assume q  = 0. The effort levels exerted by P and S solve the maximization
problems of the respective utility functions w.r.t. e given the pension schemes within the
extended pension system with choice. The expected utilities for the populist are given as
(U(P)|ﬁxext & I = 0)
= (1−q)(ke−e2+mﬁx)+q(ke−e2+f0eb W2+(1−f0e)mﬁx),
and
E(U(P)|ﬂexext & I = 0)
= (1−q)(ke−e2+m0+µf0e)+q(ke−e2+f0eb W2+(1−f0e)mﬁx).






Note that the populist always exerts higher effort under the ﬂexible scheme than under the
ﬁxed scheme. Effort levels are equal between the schemes only when q = 1, i.e. when the
ofﬁceholder will stand for reelection with certainty.
The populist chooses the ﬂexible scheme only if the resulting expected utility is







which follows from comparing the expected utilities in both cases. Analogously, the







where we have assumed that b is so large that he chooses I = 1. As f0 > f1 there exists a
non-empty interval of m0 values such that the two types of ofﬁceholders choose different
schemes, provided b is sufﬁciently high. By setting m0 equal to its lower bound in In-
equality (46), we make the populist indifferent between the two pension schemes. In this






















(f0−f1)(b W2−mﬁx) := bcrit2.
Part (iv)
Budget neutrality can be shown in the same way as in Theorem 1.
We note that if a reelection mechanism is taken into account, it is no longer possible
in this setting to motivate every statesman to implement a long-term policy, but only
those that have a sufﬁciently high value of b or a sufﬁciently low value of q, meaning
34that they do not wish to stand for reelection. This occurs because choice I = 1 impairs
their reelection chances and this loss can only be compensated by b. Once again, the
indifference requirement for the populist ensures that condition b < bcrit2 is the weakest
possible condition. It arises under a pure ﬁxed scheme (current standard scheme) as well.
Hence the extended pension system with choice does not deter any more statesmen from
choosing I = 1 than the pure ﬁxed scheme and gives populists an incentive for higher
effort.
The characterization in Theorem 2 and the budget requirements enable us to make
welfare comparisons.
Corollary 3
The extended pension system with choice is welfare-enhancing
• with respect to the ﬁxed pension scheme, as populists work harder in their last term,
• with respect to the ﬂexible pension scheme, as all statesmen implement a long-term
policy if q = 0,
• with respect to the pension system with choice, as the system can be applied to all
problem parameterizations.
Restricted to last-term situations, the extended pension system with choice is equiv-
alent to the pension system with choice, which is welfare-increasing by Corollary 2. If
q = 1, the impact of the extended system with choice is equivalent to that of a ﬁxed









exerted in a last term under the ﬂexible scheme within the pension system with choice if
and only if b W2−mﬁx > µ.
Note that if the incumbent is rejected in the elections, his pension level is equal
to mﬁx. Even in the case of q = 1, an extended pension system with choice creates higher
effort incentives, as the ﬁxed pension level under the system with choice is lower than the
pension amount in the current ﬁxed scheme because of budget neutrality as in Proposi-
tion 6. We note that for q = 1 the incumbent is indifferent between the ﬁxed and ﬂexible




































politician’s level of effort
maximum level of effort
level of effort under the ﬁxed pension system
utility of a representative voter
constant coefﬁcient in the per-capita beneﬁt equation b = ke
constant coefﬁcient deﬁning the cost of exerting effort
pension level
indicator variable, I = 1 stands for the implementation of the long-term policy
future beneﬁt for the statesman if he implements the long-term policy
ﬁxed scheme under the pension system with choice
ﬂexible scheme under the pension system with choice
pension amount under current scheme
pension level under the ﬁxed pension scheme
pension level under the ﬂexible pension scheme
welfare function
weight of the level of effort in the welfare function
ﬁxed pension payment under the ﬂexible pension scheme
vote share: s = fIe+e
coefﬁcient determining the level of ﬂexible payment within the ﬂexible scheme
coefﬁcient in the vote share depending on I, it holds f0 > f1
random factor in the vote share
upper boundary of the support interval for the random variable e
value of m0 for which P is indifferent between ﬁx and ﬂex
value of m0 for which S is indifferent between ﬁx and ﬂex
coefﬁcient giving the beneﬁt deriving from future career opportunities
probability that the incumbent is a statesman
probability that the politician wishes to stand for reelection
beneﬁt for the politician of holding ofﬁce in period 2
probability of reelection in period 2 in dependence of I
type of ofﬁceholder (S or P)
indicator function
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